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Abstract—This paper summarises results obtained by the
authors in studying security and privacy issues of web data.
The proposed approach is based on typed process calculi that
appear to be suitable for controlling access rights.
Index Terms—types, security, XML, process calculi, role based
access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
As information networks become more open and dynamic,
the need for protecting security and privacy of data is increas-
ingly important in many fields of human activities. Systems
must be able to exchange data and processes while preserving
security. In case we are given a target security policy for a
distributed system containing XML data, how can we check
weather the system behaves according to the policy? One
solution is to suitably annotate the security relevant events, to
classify them according to a type system and to verify security
properties by typing. Using a process calculus representation
of a distributed network, in [1], [2] we assign security levels to
the data and the processes of the network and prove relevant
security properties. In [3] we extend our previous work with
means for more efficient dynamic change of access rights.
Below, we give an example which points out similarities and
differences between our two approaches.
An example
Let us consider a simple distributed system consisting of
four principals: an online music store, a visitor, a registered
user and the owner of the store. Let the online store, written









The store contains lyrics of a song under title and the file song
for download. In order to describe the behaviour of the visitor,
the registered user and the owner we use process calculus
notation. So we will write
readstore/lyrics(χ)
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for a visitor wishing to read lyrics. The process
readstore/download(χ)
represents a registered user wishing to download music and
the process
changestore/download(χ, demo).enablestore(visitor)
represents the owner of the store replacing the song file with
a demo file and then offering the whole contents of the store
to any visitor for free. It is reasonable to ask that the store
behaves according to the following security conditions:
1) a visitor of the store is allowed to read the lyrics,
2) a registered user is allowed to read the lyrics and
download the music,
3) only the owner can decide to change access rights to the
data in the store.
The first approach [1], [2] assigns security levels to data and









More precisely in the calculus of [1], [2] the online store is
represented by the following data tree
store [lyrics [title1] | [download [song2]] (1)
The security level of the lyrics title is 1 and the security level
of the song file is 2. If we convene that an agent of level h
can read data of level less than or equal to h and we assign
level 1 to the visitor and level 2 to the user, then the first two
security conditions will be satisfied. In this case the owner to
show the demo to the visitor should replace the song file of
level 2 with a demo file of level 1
changestore/download(χ, demo
1) (2)
since this approach does not allow changes of access rights.
The access control has to be modified by changing the data,
so we can not say that the third security condition is satisfied.
Therefore we have considered a new approach in which the
emphasis is on dynamic changes of access right controls.
In order to accomplish that, in [3], we have introduced role-
based access control into our model. Firstly let us take the
2online store to be:
< store role = visitor >
< lyrics role = visitor >
title
< /lyrics >




or in the syntax of our calculus (using obvious abbreviations):
store
{visitor}[ly.{visitor}[title]|[down.{user}[song]] (3)
In this way we have assigned a set of roles to each tag. Let
the roles visitor, user and owner belong to a countable
set of roles which is a lattice for the partial order ⊑. We
consider the role visitor to be lower than the role user
and the role user to be lower than the role owner, i.e.:
visitor ⊑ user ⊑ owner. As expected, we assign the
role visitor to the visitor, the role user to the registered
user and the role owner to the owner of the online music
store. We say that the tag (or the edge when we use tree
representation of XML documents) store is accessible to the
process with role visitor or higher. The path store/lyrics
is accessible to the process with the role visitor since both
tags are accessible to it, while the path store/download is
not. In this approach the locations have policies which regulate
changes of access rights. For example if the store’s location
policy is
({visitor}, {({owner}, visitor)}, {({owner}, user)})
(4)
then the processes with a role lower then visitor can not
access the music store at all and that the owner may allow
visitors or ban users to access the store. After the owner places
demo file and allows all visitors to access, the store becomes:
< store role = visitor >
< lyrics role = visitor >
title
< /lyrics >




In this way also the last security condition is satisfied.
In the rest of this presentation we will relay on the given
example and we will omit almost all technical details that can
be found in the papers [1]–[3].
Paper Content
Sections II and III describe the syntax, types and security
properties of the Xdpi calculus with security levels follow-
ing [1] and its extended and revisited version [2]. Sections IV
and V describe calculus, types and security properties of the
Xdpi-calculus with role-based access control following [3].
Section VI discusses related papers.
II. MODELLING DYNAMIC WEB DATA
Our starting point is the Xdpi of Gardner and Maffeis,
introduced in [4], [5], which we equip with security levels. We
model a peer-to-peer network as a set of connected locations,
where each location has a security level and consists of a
data tree and a process. Processes can, as in pure Xdpi,
communicate with other processes, migrate to other locations
and update the local data. The novelty is that all these actions
are controlled by security levels.
The typed version of Xdpi syntax is given in Table I. The
presented data model is unordered edge-labelled rooted tree
with leaves containing empty trees, scripts and pointers. A
script is a static process embedded in a tree that can be
activated by a process from the same location. A path identifies
nodes in a tree. In a path, “a” denotes a step along an edge
a, “// ” denotes any node, “..” a step back, “•” the path
from the root to the current node, “x” a variable and “/ ”
the path composition. A pointer, p@λ, refers to the set of
data identified by the path p in the tree at the location λ. The
symbol λ ranges over location names and variables. Other data
terms, besides the scripts, the pointers and the trees, can be
easily accomodated. There are three kinds of processes:
• the processes 0, P |P , (νcTv)P , γ¯〈v〉 and γ(x).P from
pi-calculus of Milner, Parrow and Walker, [6], [7], model
local communication;
• the go command as in dpi-calculus of Hennessy [8] allows
processes to migrate from one location to another;
• the run command activates the execution of scripts that
are embedded in the local data tree and the update com-
mand modifies the local data tree. These two commands
allowing interaction between processes and data were
introduced by Gardner and Maffeis in [4].
A value is either a channel name super-scripted with a value
type, a script, a location name super-scripted with a security
level, a path or a tree. A pattern is either a script pattern,
or a pointer pattern, or a data-less tree variable, or a tree
variable. The command runp finds all the scripts in the local
tree identified by the path p and it activates their parallel
execution. The update command updatep(χ, V ) finds all the
data terms identified by the path p and pattern matches these
data terms with χ. For each successful pattern matching it
replaces the found data with the term V in which the matched
data substitutes χ. In order to improve readability of the
examples we wrote readp(χ) instead of updatep(χ, χ) and
changep(χ, V ) instead of updatep(χ, V ) when V 6= χ.
Reduction rules
The reduction relation → describes three forms of interac-
tions:
• processes can communicate with each other within a
location;
• processes can move between locations;
• processes can interact with the local data.
The reduction relation is the least relation on networks which
is closed with respect to structural equivalence and reduction
contexts. The definitions of structural equivalence, reduction
3T ::= tree
∅ empty rooted tree
x tree variable
T | T composition of trees, joining the roots
a[T ] edge labeled a with subtree T
a[Π] edge labeled a with script Π
a[p@λ] edge labeled a with pointer p@λ
p ::= a | // | .. | • | x | p/p path
V ::= Π | p@λ | T data term
P ::= process
0 the nil process
P |P parallel composition of processes
(νcTv)P restriction of s channel name
γ¯〈v〉 output of value v on channel γ
γ(x).P input parametrised by a variable x
!γ(x).P replication of an input process
go λ.P migrates to location λ, continue as P
go  .P migrates to source location, continue as P
runp runs the scripts identified by path p
updatep(χ, V ).P updates data identified by path p and
matching with χ
v ::= cTv | P | lh | p | T value
χ ::= xj | y⋆@xj | xDL | x pattern
N ::= network
0 empty network
N | N parallel composition of networks
lh[T ‖ P ] location
(νcTv)N restriction of a channel name
TABLE I
THE Xdpi SYNTAX
contexts and reduction relation can be found in [1] and [2].
Here we only give an example of reduction.
Example 1: Let the location of the online music store be
named m, have a security level 2 and contain the data tree
Ts and the process Po. If we take Ts to be the data tree (1)
and Po to be the process (2), then the network containing only
location m reduces as follows
m2[Ts ‖ Po]→ m
2[T ′s ‖ 0]
where T ′s ≡ store [lyrics [title1] | [download [demo1]].
III. SECURITY LEVELS AND TYPES
A type system, in general, splits elements of the calculus
into sets called types and makes certain behaviours (actions)
illegal on the basis of the types that are thus assigned. The
goal of our work is to verify the security properties by typing.
A. Types
Many type systems controlling the use of resources and
the mobility of processes have been proposed for the dpi
calculus [9] and for related calculi [10]–[12]. Our type system
is based on types for locations, data and processes, expressing
security levels and it is essentially inspired by the security
types checking access rights for pi-calculus of [13]. Its main
goals are to control communication of values, access to data
and migration of processes between locations. The syntax of
types introduced in [2] is the content of Table II.
The access and mobility rights of a process depend on the
security level of the “source” location of the process itself, i.e.
Ch(Tv) type of channels communicating values of
type Tv
Loc(i) type of locations at security level i
Script(i) type of scripts at security level i
Path type of paths, not containing •
PathLocal type of paths, possibly containing •
Pointer(i) type of pointers, not containing local paths, at
security level i
PointerLocal(i) type of pointers, possibly containing local
paths, at security level i
DTLTree type of data-less trees
Tree type of trees, not containing local paths
TreeLocal type of trees, possibly containing local paths
Proc(i) type of processes, not containing local paths,
at security level i
P rocLocal(i) type of processes, possibly containing local
paths, at security level i
Net type of networks
where i ∈ L and Tv ranges over value types defined by
Tv ::= Ch(Tv) | Loc(i) | Script(i) | Path⋆ | DTLTree | Tree⋆
TABLE II
THE SYNTAX OF Xdpi TYPES
of the location where the process was in the initial network
or where the process was created by the activation of a script.
More details on the types and the type assignment rules can
be found in [1], [2].
B. Properties
Our system satisfies the property of subject reduction which
means that a well-typed network reduces to a well-typed
network. It is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Subject reduction): Let ⊢ N : Net and N →
N
′
, then ⊢ N′ : Net.
Using the subject reduction, we can show some more
meaningful properties of typed networks:
PL0 A channel in a process whose source location has level h
can communicate only the values whose security levels
are less than or equal to h;
PL1 A process whose source location has level h can migrate
to a location of level j only if j ≤ h;
PL2 A process whose source location has level h can copy
from the local tree only the data of level j with j ≤ h;
PL3 A process whose source location has level h can modify
in the local tree only the data of level j with j < h, unless
the process itself was generated by running a script of
security level h in a tree at path p, and in this case it can
modify scripts which are both of the security level h and
reachable by the path p;
PL4 A script of level j which is a leaf of a tree in a location
of level i can be activated only if j ≤ i.
We have formalised the network properties assured by our
type system using the notions of network invariant and initial
network as in [14]. For more details and all proofs we refer
to the paper [2], while here we give an example.
Example 2: Let us consider the location m of the online
music store of Example 1. We can assign type Tree to the
data tree Ts. If the source location of the process Po is at
security level 3, then the location m has type Net. If the
4source location of the process Po is at security level 2, then
the location m is not typeable in our typing system because,
according to the security property PL4, a process whose source
location is of level 2 can only modify data of security level 1.
In other words, our typing system would rule out the user of
security level 2, “pretending to be the owner”, which aims to
modify song file.
IV. ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL IN Xdpi
In the example given in the Introduction we have stated
the motivation for designing a model of dynamic web data
in a RBAC scenario. In [3] we have equipped the Xdpi-
calculus with roles and named the obtained calculus rXdpi-
calculus: the syntax of rXdpi is the content of Table III. As
in the original calculus a network is a parallel composition of
connected locations. Each location has a policy and consists
of a data tree labelled with roles and a process with roles. We
assume a countable set of roles R, and use r, s, t to range over
elements of R. Let (R,⊑) be a lattice and let ⊥,⊤ ∈ R be
its bottom and top element, respectively. The operation of join
is denoted by ⊔. By α, ρ, σ we denote non-empty sets of roles
and by τ, ζ sets of roles containing the ⊤ element. The trees of
rXdpi are those of Xdpi where each edge is assigned a set of
roles containing the ⊤ element. Pure processes are essentially
Xdpi processes to which we add commands for administration
of access rights. The commands read and change are in
place of the update command of [4]. The new commands
enable and disable change permissions to access data by
adding or removing roles from edges in the local data tree.
A process with roles is obtained from a pure process by
assigning a set of roles ρ to it or as a parallel composition of
such processes. Processes with (possibly different) roles can
share private communication channels (restriction operator ν).
Different processes can have different sets of roles and the
same role can be assigned to different edges and different
processes. In the syntax of paths, we do not consider paths
containing // , .. and • and we decorate path edge labels with
sets of roles. For simplicity, in the examples of this paper,
we have omitted these decorations. There are other minor
differences between rXdpi and Xdpi which we will omit.
Reduction rules
Processes with roles can, as in pure Xdpi, communicate
with other processes, migrate to other locations and update the
local data. All these actions are controlled by roles. Moreover,
processes can administrate roles by enabling and disabling
them. More details and the formal definition of reduction
relation can be found in [3], while here we give an example.
Example 3: Let the location of the online music store be
named m and contain the data tree Ts and the process Po. If
we take Ts to be the data tree (3) and Po to be the process
enablestore(visitor)q
{owner}
, then the network containing
only location m reduces as follows
m[Ts ‖ Po]→ m[T
′
s ‖ 0]
where T ′s is
store{visitor}[ly.{visitor}[title]|[down.{user,visitor}[song]].
T ::= tree
∅ empty rooted tree
x tree variable
T | T composition of trees, joining the roots
aτ [T ] edge labeled aτ with subtree T
aτ [Π] edge labeled aτ with script Π
aτ [p@λ] edge labeled aτ with pointer p@λ
p ::= aα | x | p/p path
V ::= Π | p@λ | T data term
P ::= pure process
0 the nil process
P |P parallel composition of processes
γ¯〈v〉 output of value v on channel γ
γ(x).P input parametrised by a variable x
!γ(x).P replication of an input process
go λ.R migrates to location λ, continue as P
runp runs the scripts identified by path p
readp(χ).P reads data identified by path p and matching
with χ
changep(χ, V ).P changes data identified by path p and
matching with χ
enablep (r).P allows role r to access data identified by
path p
disablep (r).P forbids role r to access data identified by
path p
R ::= process with roles
Pqρ single pure process with roles ρ assigned to it
R|R parallel composition of processes with roles
(νcTv)R restriction of a channel name
v ::= cTv | R | l | p | T value
χ ::= x(σ,E,D) | y(α)@x(σ,E,D) | x(σ,E,D,τ,ζ) pattern
N ::= network
0 empty network
N | N parallel composition of networks
l[T ‖ P ] location
(νcTv)N restriction of a channel name
TABLE III
THErXdpi SYNTAX
V. SECURITY POLICIES AND TYPES
A location policy is the triple (σ, E ,D), where σ is a set of
roles, and E and D are subsets of {(ρ, r) : ρ ⊆ R, r ∈ R}.
The data accessibility policy is given by the set σ, the set of
minimal roles a process is required to have to access the data
at that location. The administration policy is given by the other
sets which prescribe changes of data access rights as follows:
if (ρ, r) ∈+ E , a process with roles ρ can give the permission
to (enable) the role r to access the data; if (ρ, r) ∈− D, a
process with roles ρ can take the permission from (disable)
the role r to access the data. ∈+ and ∈− are defined in [3] as
extensions of ∈ in order to give more flexibility to the location
policy.
A. Types
Given a location policy we can check if a data tree and
a process conform to it. The syntax of rXdpi types is the
content of Table IV. Our type system assures that: if a process
can access an edge in a well-typed tree, then the edge is
connected to the root of the tree by a path whose edges are
all accessible to that process; only processes agreeing with the
location policy can be activated at a location and can migrate
5Ch(Tv) type of channels communicating values of
type Tv
Loc(P) type of locations with policy P
Script(P) type of scripts which can be activated at
locations with policy P
Path(α) type of paths having the last edge with set of
roles α
Pointer(α) type of pointers whose path is typed by
Path(α)
Tree(P, τ, ζ) type of trees, which can stay at locations
with policy P , with initial branches asking
τ and which can be completely accessed by
processes with at least one role of ζ
Proc(P, ρ) type of pure processes, which can stay at
locations with policy P and which can be
assigned roles ρ
ProcRole(P) type of processes with roles which can stay at
locations with policy P
Net type of networks
Tv ranges over value types defined by:
Tv ::= Ch(Tv) | Loc(P) | Script(P) | Path(α) | Tree(P, τ, ζ)
TABLE IV
THE SYNTAX OF rXdpi TYPES
to it; a process can modify a subtree only if it can access all
the edges of the subtree; agreeing with the location policy, a
process can enable a role at an edge or disable a role from a
subtree if it can access the path which identifies it.
Other common features of RBAC system we did not con-
sider in [3], since we could smoothly add them to the present
calculus, are: incompatible roles, static and dynamic separation
of roles, limits on the number of users authorised for a given
role.
B. Properties
Besides subject reduction property, we can prove the fol-
lowing relevant access control properties.
Properties of location policies and communication:
PR0 All trees and processes in a location agree with the
location policy;
PR1 A process with roles can communicate only values with
at least one characteristic role lower than or equal to one
role of the process.
Properties of migration between locations:
PR2 A process with roles can migrate to another location only
if it agrees with the policy of that location.
Properties of process access to local data trees:
PR3 A process with roles looks for a path in the local tree
only if the path is accessible to the process.
PR4 A process with roles can get a data in the local tree only
if the data is accessible to the process.
Properties of manipulation of local data trees by processes:
PR5 A script is activated in a location only if the correspond-
ing process with roles agrees with the policy of that
location;
PR6 A process with roles generated by a read command in a
location agrees with the policy of that location;
PR7 A process with roles can erase a subtree of data only if
it can access the whole subtree;
PR8 A tree built by a change command in a location agrees
with the policy of that location;
PR9 A process with roles can add a role to an edge in the
local tree only if this is allowed by the location policy;
PR10 A tree built by an enable command in a location agrees
with the policy of that location;
PR11 A process with roles can erase a role from a subtree of the
local tree only if this is allowed by the location policy;
PR12 A tree built by a disable command in a location agrees
with the policy of that location.
More details on the location policies, the types, the type
assignment rules and the security properties are discussed
in [3] while here we give an example.
Example 4: Let us consider the location m of the online
music store with location policy (4) containing the data tree
Ts of Example 3 and the process Pu. The process Pu cannot
be enablest(visitor)q{user}, i.e. a process with role user
aiming to give permission to the role visitor to access the
file. Since ({user}, visitor) /∈ {({owner}, visitor)}, the
process Pu does not agree with the store’s policy and according
to the security property PR0, the location m is not typeable in
our typing system. In other words, our typing system would
rule out the user, “pretending to be the owner”, wishing to
enable the visitors to access the song.
VI. RELATED WORK
The Xdpi calculus [4], [5] models both localised, mobile
processes and distributed, dynamic, semi-structured data, al-
lowing to represent data-sharing applications. It can be seen
as an extension of the Active XML model [15]. The locations
and the processes of Xdpi are essentially those of dpi [8],
[9] enriched with capabilities for data manipulation. The only
difference is that a process in dpi can migrate to a location
independently from the existence of the location itself in the
current network, while in Xdpi such an existence is a necessary
condition for migration. The data trees of Xdpi are related to
those in [16], [17] and the treatment of shared distributed data
is inspired by [18].
In the SafeDpi calculus [19] parameterised code may be
sent between locations and types restrict the capabilities and
access rights of any processes launched by incoming code.
Co-actions have been introduced for ambient calculi as a basic
mechanism for regulating access to locations and use of their
resources [11], [20], [21]. More refined controls for ambient
calculi include passwords [22], [23], classifications in groups
[12], [24], mandatory access control policies [25], membranes
regulating the interaction between computing bodies and ex-
ternal environments [26].
Role based access control has been introduced in the seven-
ties and first formalised by Ferraiolo and Kuhn [27]. There is a
large amount of literature on models and implementations for
RBAC, we only mention [28]–[31]. The standard defined in
2004 is currently under revision by the Committe CS1.1 within
the International Committee for Information Technologies
Standards [32].
The most related papers to [3] are [33] and [34]. Braghin et
al. [33] equip the pi-calculus with the notion of user: they tag
6processes with names of users and with sets of roles. Processes
can activate and deactivate roles. A mapping between roles
and users and a mapping between read/write actions and roles
control access rights. A type discipline statically guaranties
that systems not respecting the above mappings are rejected.
Compagnoni et al. [34] define a boxed ambient calculus
extended with a distributed RBAC mechanism where each
ambient controls its own access policy. A process is associated
with an owner and a set of activated roles that grant permis-
sions for mobility and communication. The calculus includes
primitives to activate and deactivate roles. The behaviour of
these primitives is determined by the process’s owner, its
current location and its currently activated roles.
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